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U. S. v. EMBREY

that difficulty, it proceeded to hold-in what seems a ques16
tionable decision-that there was no contract at all.
Under the majority rule discussed above, and approved
in Zalis v. Walter,'1 7 the measure of damages could have
been calculated on the basis of a contract calling for one
hundred pounds of tack at $2.72 as that was the alternative
least burdensome to the defendant and all the contract
called for as far as the plaintiff was concerned.
The approval of this majority rule of damages for
breach of an alternative contract in Zalis v. Walter'1 would
seem to indicate that the Court of Appeals would not hesitate now to apply it in an appropriate case.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CLASSIFICATION BY
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
United States v. Embrey'
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by a
mother to inquire into the detention of her son who had
been inducted into the military service under the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940.2 The ground for complaint was that the mother was dependent on the son and
that the son should have been classified as 3-A instead of
1-A, and that accordingly her son's induction was premature. An order to show cause was allowed, setting a date
for a hearing. The respondents answered, reciting the
various formal proceedings before the Local Draft Board
and the appropriate Appeals Board. The evidence at the
hearing supported the answer (which also was not traversed) that there had been numerous hearings with reference to the appropriateness of the registrant's classification, and that he had been given and had exercised fully
his right to present his case before the Local Board, the
appropriate Appeal Board, and the National Headquarters,
resulting in his ultimate classification as 1-A and his induc"I The facts of the case reviewed in the text 8upra, circa n. 12 would seem
to be sufficient to have supported a holding that there was a contract. The
reasoning of the court overlooked the fact that the letter of the plaintiff
indicating an entry of the defendant's order, with the election open, might
have concluded a good alternative contract.
17 Supra, circa notes 1 and 2.
's Ibid.
46 F. Supp. 916 (D. C. Md., 1942).
2 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix Sec. 801 et seq.

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

tion. 3 The Court said that it could not "be successfully
urged that the registrant did not have adequate hearings
in accordance with due process."4 The petitioner urged,
though, that the classification was "arbitrary and capricious .. . because without substantial evidence and by
reason of personal bias and hostility against him."5
The Court, recognizing that the permissible scope of review "does not properly include a determination of the
real merits of the case", nevertheless seems to have accepted a wide range of testimony, repeating for the most
part what was probably before the Local Board. The
Court, after reviewing the proceedings before the various
boards and the evidence as submitted, said "I make the
ultimate finding of fact that the actions of the Local Board
and more particularly the Board of Appeals in this case
were not arbitrary or capricious but were based on legally
substantial evidence." Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.
The evidence before the Court as to the dependency of
registrant's mother revealed that she had a husband from
whom she was separated, and it was not shown that he was
not legally obliged to support her. On the question as to
whether registrant had in good faith assumed the support
of his mother, the evidence was conflicting. It further appeared that registrant had made false statements on his
questionnaire; although these statements were not relevant to the question of dependency, yet they did have a
bearing on registrant's reliability. Registrant also contended that there was bias in that the Clerk of the Local
Draft Board desired to obtain control of the registrant's
restaurant business, and used his influence to poison the
minds of the Board and caused them to reject the registrant's evidence of dependency and to disregard the sup8 Petitioner's son registered on January 28, 1941; in his questionnaire his
mother and sister were claimed as dependents; after a hearing before the
Local Board on February 11 registrant was classified in class 1; registrant
passed his physical examination and was classified, on March 4, as 1-A; he
was given two deferments to arrange his business; on September 3, his
classification was changed to 1-H because of his age; on December 1, the
age limit having been changed by statute, he was reclassified as 1-A; an
appeal to the Board of Appeals on January 8 resulted in an affirmance of
his classification; an appeal was then taken to the National Headquarters,
and because of the submission of new evidence the matter was sent back
to the Local Board; after hearing the new evidence, the Local Board again
classified him as 1-A; an appeal was taken to the Appeals Board which
affirmed his classification; and on August 22 registrant was ordered to
report for induction.
'46 F. Supp. 916, 919 (D. C. Md., 1942)
Ibid.
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porting evidence of other witnesses. The Court found that
this allegation of bias was not supported by substantial evidence, that the Clerk had not been called as a witness in the
instant case, and that the Draft Board had heard witnesses
as to the dependency of the mother. The Court also observed that there was nothing to indicate arbitrary action,
personal bias, or prejudice on the part of the Appeals
Board.
This decision is the first of the cases under the 1940 Act
in this district, although there have been a number of such
cases elsewhere. It follows the usual pattern of such cases
under the Act of 1940, as well as the earlier cases under the
Act of 1917.' That is, most of such cases were habeas
corpus proceedings," and most of them resulted in dismissals after a judicial inquiry into the evidence on which
the boards made their findings, the courts usually reciting
that the findings were not arbitrary or capricious, or abuses
of discretion. Under the Act of 1917, only six cases ordered
the selectee released.' Under the present law, only one
case, Application of Greenberg,10 has ordered a discharge
of the selectee.
In the Greenberg case a writ of habeas corpus was filed
by a wife who alleged that her husband had been improperly classified. The petitioner and the registrant became
engaged in December, 1939 and at that time set January 4,
1941 as the date for their wedding. The day before the
wedding the registrant took his preliminary physical examination and on January 7, 1941 he was classified as 1-A.
a See Petition of Soberman, 37 F. Supp. 522 (D. C. N. Y., 1941) ; Dick v.
Tevlin, 37 F. Supp. 183 (D. C. N. J., 1942) ; Application of Greenberg, 39 F.
Supp. 13 (D. C. N. J., 1941) ; United States ex rel. Errichetti v. Baird, 39
F. Supp. 388 (D. C. N. Y., 1941) ; United States ex rel. Ursitti v. Baird, 39 F.
Supp. 872 (D. C. N. Y., 1941); Checinski v. United States, 129 F. (2d) 461
(C. C. A. 6th, 1942) ; Rase v. United States, 129 F. (2d) 204 (C. C. A. 6th,
1942). See, also, cases reviewed in Note, Judicial Review of Selective
Service Board Clasifications by Habeas Corpus (1942) 10 G. W. L. Rev.
827, 841-844.
7 See Arbitman v. Woodside, 258 F. 441 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919) and cases
cited in Note, Judicial Review of Selective Service Board Classifications
by Habeas Corpus (1942) 10 G. W. L. Rev. 827, 829 n. 7.
. Two cases were denials of injunction, Bonifaci v. Thompson, 252 Fed.
878 (D. C. Wash., 1917) ; Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54 (C. C. A. 2d,
1917) (Court suggested either certiorari or habeas corpus would be appropriate). One case involved denial of certiorari, United States ex rel.
Roman v. Rauch, 253 Fed. 814 (S. D. N. Y., 1918).
Ex parte Beck, 245 Fed. 967 (D. C. Mont., 1917) ; Ex parte Fuston, 253
Fed. 90 (E. D. Tenn., 1918) ; Ex parte McDonald, 253 Fed. 99 (E. D. Wis.,
1918) ; Ex parte Cohen, 254 Fed. 711 (E. D. Va., 1918) ; Arbitman v. Woodside, 258 Fed. 441 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919); Rome v. Marsh, 272 Fed. 982
(D. C. Mass., 1920).
,0 39 F. Supp. 13 (D. C. N. J., 1941).
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It was petitioner's contention that the proper classification
was 3-A since she was entirely dependent upon registrant
for support at the time of his classification. The Local
Board made the 1-A classification because it felt that petitioner would suffer no hardship; this classification was
upheld by the Appeal Board. The Court found that the
wife had no independent income, that the husband's only
income was his salary of $35 a week, that registrant's induction would force his wife to leave an apartment and return
to her parents. The conclusion was that the Local Draft
Board and the Appeal Board had acted arbitrarily in the
matter and that petitioner was a bona fide dependent upon
registrant on the date of his classification.
The Greenberg decision became the subject of an extended bit of criticism in The George Washington Law
Review,11 which took the position that the judicial function
in such cases does not go beyond supervising the jurisdiction and procedure of the administrative machinery. That
is, the deferments are not matters of constitutional, or even
absolute statutory, right but are dependent upon administrative finding, under statutory set procedure, that a deferred classification of the particular individual is called
for in the interests of national welfare under classes to be
established by executive direction. The extent to which
such deferment exists and the form under which it is
granted depends upon legislative grant and executive direction only. If the legislature has directed, as it has, that
a classification, after appropriate hearing and opportunity
for appeal, is to be final, the Court's function on review
would seem to be limited to a determination of whether
the board (or system as a whole) to which that determina12
tion is left has stayed within the legislative mandate.
The Court, in the instant case, seems to have been appreciative of these limitations, 3 but in its opinion gives the
petitioner a full judicial consideration of the evidence in
determining whether the administrative action of the Se" Op. cit. supra, n. 6. The note relies mainly on analogy to the immigration cases: Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 661 (1892);
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908) ; Tod v. Waldman, 266 U. S.
113 (1924) ; United States v. Petkas, 214 Fed. 978 (C. C. A. 1st, 1914).
12 This assumes of course the constitutionality of the statutes. The constitutionality of the 1917 Act was upheld in the Selective Draft Cases
(Arver v. United States), 245 U. S. 366, L. R. A. 1918C, 361, Ann. Cas.
1918 B, 856 (1918). The constitutionality of the 1940 Act has been upheld
in United States v. Lambert, 123 Fed. (2d) 395 (1941) and was not questioned in the Instant case.
18 See text, supra, first sentence of second paragraph.
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lective Service System had been so contrary to the evidence as to be arbitrary and capricious. Certainly, the petitioner was entitled to no more. It is questionable if the
petitioner was entitled to that much.1"

TIME WHEN DRAFTEE FIRST BECOMES
SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW
Ex Parte Billings'
Petitioner claimed exemption from military service as
a conscientious objector. 2 Both the Local Draft Board and
the Appeal Board denied this claim, and petitioner was
ordered to report to the reception center. Petitioner reported there and passed the physical examinations, but
then refused to take the oath of induction. After having
been sent to the guardhouse, petitioner applied for a writ
of habeas corpus. The writ was denied.
The sole function of the writ of habeas corpus is to
"determine whether the person seeking the benefit of it is
illegally restrained in his liberty."'3 Here the immediate
problem was whether the Army had jurisdiction over the
petitioner. The importance of this question was shown by
the fact that had the Court decided that petitioner was entitled to a civil trial rather than a court martial, it was
probable that petitioner would have walked away scotfree.
As he had fully complied with the requirements of the Selective Training and Service Act, it was doubtful whether
1 See Note, Judicial Review of Selective Service Board Classifications by
Habeas Corpus (1942) 10 G. W. L. Rev. 827, 841-844. A quaere might be
raised as to whether the Court had doubts as to the appropriateness of
the review under petition for habeas corpus where the ground for review
was only that the fact determination of the Local Board and the Appeal
Board was arbitrary. The opinion was prefaced by the observation: "Nor
is any question raised as to the propriety of the procedure in applying for
the writ of habeas corpus." Cf. Larson, The Doctrine of Constitutional
Fact (1941) 15 Temple Univ. L. Q. 185, 199 et seq., for a discussion of types
of judicial review appropriate for various kinds of fact-finding by administrative boards.
F. Supp. 663 (D. C. Kan., 1943).
50 U. S. C. A. 305(g) : "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and
service in the land or naval forces of the United States who, by reason of
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form . . ."
$HART, AN INTRoDUCToN To ADImimTATIm LAW (1940) 480.
146

